By PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s visit to Naypyidaw, the capital of Burma, on Oct. 11 has marked a new chapter in the Democrat Party’s relations with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
It is the first time a prime minister from the Democratic Party has paid a visit to Burma in almost two decades. During 1997-2001, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai refused to visit Burma because of his supposedly pro-democracy agenda at home.
The situation surrounding the Thai-Burmese relations has changed over the years, and so has the current government’s policy toward Naypyidaw.
Legitimate or otherwise, Abhisit’s foreign policy toward Burma reflects the political realities in both countries. Thailand’s democratization has in the past few years stagnated with the Abhisit government fighting for its survival against political threats posed by the Redshirt movement.
Meanwhile, the Democrat Party’s long-held pro-democracy platform has increasingly become rhetorical. The perception of the Abhisit government being reluctant to push for political reforms serves to belittle its pro-democracy credentials. On this basis, Thailand is finding it more difficult to preach to its Burmese neighbor to promote democracy and to respect human rights.
In Burma too, an election will take place on Nov. 7, the first time in 20 years. The Burmese generals have planned this political transition carefully, ensuring that the political power will remain firmly in the hand of their military elite, some of whom are now wearing civilian clothes. Like it or not, there will be no new Burma, just a more "civilianized" and perhaps a slightly less repressive regime.
Abhisit’s visit to Naypyidaw seems to symbolize the shift of direction in Thailand’s Burmese policy and its realistic response to Burma’s political transition.
Currently, there are two emerging views in Thailand. On the one hand, the advent of a civilian regime in Burma could instigate a legitimacy crisis and the loss of justification for Thailand’s traditional hostile policy toward Burma, which was deeply rooted in its embittered historical interactions. After the elections, however, Thailand will unexpectedly legitimize Burma’s civilian regime, thus debunking its old construct of Burma posing a threat.
The first few years after the election will be a trial period for the new regime. There will be numerous obstacles that will challenge Burma’s new government. The change will not be restricted within the domestic domain, but will engender an impact on Thai-Burmese relations. With this change, Thailand will search for a new legitimacy in its policy toward Burma. Certain Thai governments in the past exploited the negative image of Burma’s military regime in order to justify its foreign policy interests and appease its international allies despite the fact that they were not any less despotic than their Burmese counterparts.
In retrospect, Thai-Burmese relations have been marred by distorted historical memory and the state-constructed perception of threat. Ties have become more “normal” only when leaders of both sides agreed to let their economic imperatives take a front seat in the conduct of diplomacy toward each other. Skeptics may have dismissed the upcoming elections; they believe Burma is leaping into a greater unknown.
Regardless, Burma will be recasting itself into a more recognizable entity, not necessarily a democratic one. Asean and Thailand will welcome the new regime, since both have already endorsed the SPDC’s roadmap to democracy.
On the other hand, the arrival of Burma’s new government will broaden Thailand’s policy options. Thailand will no longer be confined within its own self-serving discourse of an antagonistic Burma. Indeed, prior to Abhisit’s visit, his Democrat government, known for its critical view of Burma in the past, has gradually distanced itself from such discourse while renewing the country’s friendly ties with the junta.
The Abhisit government has made a bold step in the new implementation of its policy toward Burma. Departing from its pro-democracy, pro-West and anti-junta standpoint, Prime Minister Abhisit earlier instructed the Ministry of Commerce to put in place the necessary measures that would increase two-way trade with the Burmese regime.
A special economic zone along the common border will soon be set up, thus encouraging Thais to seek business opportunities in Burma. Prime Minister Abhisit himself revealed that Thailand was in the process of upgrading the Singkhon checkpoint in Prachuap Khiri Khan’s Muang District to serve a new economic center in southern Burma.
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s visit to Naypyidaw, the capital of Burma, on Oct. 11 has marked a new chapter in the Democrat Party’s relations with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
It is the first time a prime minister from the Democratic Party has paid a visit to Burma in almost two decades. During 1997-2001, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai refused to visit Burma because of his supposedly pro-democracy agenda at home.
The situation surrounding the Thai-Burmese relations has changed over the years, and so has the current government’s policy toward Naypyidaw.
Legitimate or otherwise, Abhisit’s foreign policy toward Burma reflects the political realities in both countries. Thailand’s democratization has in the past few years stagnated with the Abhisit government fighting for its survival against political threats posed by the Redshirt movement.
Meanwhile, the Democrat Party’s long-held pro-democracy platform has increasingly become rhetorical. The perception of the Abhisit government being reluctant to push for political reforms serves to belittle its pro-democracy credentials. On this basis, Thailand is finding it more difficult to preach to its Burmese neighbor to promote democracy and to respect human rights.
In Burma too, an election will take place on Nov. 7, the first time in 20 years. The Burmese generals have planned this political transition carefully, ensuring that the political power will remain firmly in the hand of their military elite, some of whom are now wearing civilian clothes. Like it or not, there will be no new Burma, just a more "civilianized" and perhaps a slightly less repressive regime.
Abhisit’s visit to Naypyidaw seems to symbolize the shift of direction in Thailand’s Burmese policy and its realistic response to Burma’s political transition.
Currently, there are two emerging views in Thailand. On the one hand, the advent of a civilian regime in Burma could instigate a legitimacy crisis and the loss of justification for Thailand’s traditional hostile policy toward Burma, which was deeply rooted in its embittered historical interactions. After the elections, however, Thailand will unexpectedly legitimize Burma’s civilian regime, thus debunking its old construct of Burma posing a threat.
The first few years after the election will be a trial period for the new regime. There will be numerous obstacles that will challenge Burma’s new government. The change will not be restricted within the domestic domain, but will engender an impact on Thai-Burmese relations. With this change, Thailand will search for a new legitimacy in its policy toward Burma. Certain Thai governments in the past exploited the negative image of Burma’s military regime in order to justify its foreign policy interests and appease its international allies despite the fact that they were not any less despotic than their Burmese counterparts.
In retrospect, Thai-Burmese relations have been marred by distorted historical memory and the state-constructed perception of threat. Ties have become more “normal” only when leaders of both sides agreed to let their economic imperatives take a front seat in the conduct of diplomacy toward each other. Skeptics may have dismissed the upcoming elections; they believe Burma is leaping into a greater unknown.
Regardless, Burma will be recasting itself into a more recognizable entity, not necessarily a democratic one. Asean and Thailand will welcome the new regime, since both have already endorsed the SPDC’s roadmap to democracy.
On the other hand, the arrival of Burma’s new government will broaden Thailand’s policy options. Thailand will no longer be confined within its own self-serving discourse of an antagonistic Burma. Indeed, prior to Abhisit’s visit, his Democrat government, known for its critical view of Burma in the past, has gradually distanced itself from such discourse while renewing the country’s friendly ties with the junta.
The Abhisit government has made a bold step in the new implementation of its policy toward Burma. Departing from its pro-democracy, pro-West and anti-junta standpoint, Prime Minister Abhisit earlier instructed the Ministry of Commerce to put in place the necessary measures that would increase two-way trade with the Burmese regime.
A special economic zone along the common border will soon be set up, thus encouraging Thais to seek business opportunities in Burma. Prime Minister Abhisit himself revealed that Thailand was in the process of upgrading the Singkhon checkpoint in Prachuap Khiri Khan’s Muang District to serve a new economic center in southern Burma.
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