Who’s Afraid of Democracy?

By ARNOLD CORSO

Over the past few months, debate has raged among Burmese on whether or not to participate in the upcoming Nov. 7 election. Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy have called for a boycott, alleging that credible elections are impossible under current conditions. Meanwhile, many people who are frustrated with Burma’s current plight hope the political transition will improve livelihoods and open space for civil society, if not lead to democracy
.

However, recent scholarly analysis on political parties in authoritarian regimes gives cause for both cautious optimism and further worries. According to these studies, political parties can actually strengthen authoritarian elites, but also require them to distribute the benefits of economic growth more widely.

In “Political Institutions under Dictatorship,” Emory University Professor Jennifer Gandhi finds that authoritarian leaders are more likely to introduce political parties and elections when they face strong opposition and the leadership depends upon the masses to stay in power. Likewise, in “Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization,” University of Texas Professor Jason Browlnee argues that parties provide a mechanism for rulers to distribute goods and patronage to favored supporters and to co-opt potential opponents. In particular, election results provide leaders with information about which parts of the country are dissatisfied with the regime’s performance, allowing them to target rewards or punishments to specific areas. This last feature is crucial in the absence of a free press that can report on public opinion.

Even more worrying, both Gandhi and Brownlee conclude that these tactics work. Authoritarian leaders who rule through strong political parties are more likely to remain in power than those who do not. However, in order to work, the regime’s party must be disciplined and have a strong organizational structure.

Browlnee compares the success of Malaysia’s United Malays National Organization (UMNO) with the failure of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos’ Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). While KBL distributed patronage to a narrow elite closely affiliated with the Marcos family, UMNO distributed government contracts widely and was usually able to reconcile any intra-elite disputes before they split the party. UMNO also has a prominent youth wing that identifies and grooms young political talent. Political parties also stabilize leadership transitions by making the party—not any single autocrat—the main vehicle for authoritarian power.

Burma has never really had strong political parties. The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League had a dominant majority in Parliament during the early 1950s, but the party split into “clean” and “stable” factions based on personality differences among the leadership. Even the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which monopolized political life under the 1974 Constitution, was effectively a shroud for Gen Ne Win’s rule. When Ne Win lost the 1977 elections for BSPP party chairmanship, he simply called an extraordinary party congress later that year and engineered his “victory.” As the BSPP became a liability in 1988, he quickly resigned, and the party’s successor, the National Unity Party (NUP), won just 10 seats in the 1990 election. While Snr-Gen Than Shwe has groomed the Union Solidarity and Development Association for a future as a ruling party, thus far it—running under its new name, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)—has had no experience in government.

Therefore, going into the November election, the real question is whether the USDP as led by Prime Minister Thein Sein will resemble UMNO or KBL.
As reported in The Irrawaddy and other exile Burmese media, the USDP has aggressively distributed bank loans, funeral services and other goods to voters. It is far less clear, however, whether the party will replace the military as the primary organization for politics. The USDP still seems focused on Burma’s current elite and has fielded candidates from among the country’s military generals and tycoons. The party does recruit youth into the organization, but more as hired thugs than new political talent. Already, one hears rumors that certain military officers are less than enthusiastic about the party’s place at the forefront of politics. Nonetheless, the current elite clearly views the USDP as the vehicle for its future ambitions—as the massive USDA building in Naypyidaw attests.

Even if hopes for democratization appear less likely, Burma’s transition might lead to a somewhat more equitable economy. According to a recent report by Macquarie University’s Sean Turnell, Burma’s elites have seized most of the revenues from natural resource exports, an industry notorious for its lack of transparency and inability to provide employment opportunities.